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Brain correlates of the sense of agency have recently received increased attention.
However, the explorations remain largely restricted to the study of brains in isolation.
The prototypical paradigm used so far consists of manipulating visual perception of own
action while asking the subject to draw a distinction between self- versus externally
caused action. However, the recent definition of agency as a multifactorial phenomenon
combining bottom-up and top-down processes suggests the exploration of more complex
situations. Notably there is a need of accounting for the dynamics of agency in a
two-body context where we often experience the double faceted question of who is
at the origin of what in an ongoing interaction. In a dyadic context of role switching
indeed, each partner can feel body ownership, share a sense of agency and altogether
alternate an ascription of the primacy of action to self and to other. To explore the
brain correlates of these different aspects of agency, we recorded with dual EEG and
video set-ups 22 subjects interacting via spontaneous versus induced imitation (II) of hand
movements. The differences between the two conditions lie in the fact that the roles
are either externally attributed (induced condition) or result from a negotiation between
subjects (spontaneous condition). Results demonstrate dissociations between self- and
other-ascription of action primacy in delta, alpha and beta frequency bands during the
condition of II. By contrast a similar increase in the low gamma frequency band (38–47Hz)
was observed over the centro-parietal regions for the two roles in spontaneous imitation
(SI). Taken together, the results highlight the different brain correlates of agency at play
during live interactions.
Keywords: agency, hyperscanning, EEG, imitation, social interaction
INTRODUCTION
A growing body of neuroimaging studies explore agency as the
capacity to locate the origin of an action in the self. Yet, if we leave
a solipsistic view of individual agency, we should take account
of the fact that human agency is to a large extent determined
by social factors (de Jaegher and Froese, 2009). Far from being
limited to know whether an action comes from self or from an
external source, we usually have to determine what caused the
action to be ours in an interactive context. Notably there is a need
of accounting for the dynamics of agency in a two-body context
where we often experience the double faceted question of who is
at the origin of what in an ongoing interaction. Using dual EEG
and video set-ups, the aim of the present study was to explore the
brain correlates of such a phenomenon.
Philosophers (Wittgenstein, 1958; de Vignemont and
Fourneret, 2004; Gallagher, 2007; de Vignemont, 2011) have
argued that agency is too complex an experience to be described
as a unitary phenomenon. When, through our proprioception,
we feel our body moving, we ascribe without any doubt the
ownership of the action to our body (Wittgenstein, 1958). Vision,
however, can affect the proprioceptive message about body
knowledge, as demonstrated by the rubber hand illusion: indeed,
watching a rubber hand being stroked together with the subject’s
own unseen hand causes the rubber hand to be ascribed as
part of the subject’s body (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson
et al., 2005; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Thus, a multisensory
integration is suggested to be the underlying mechanism of
body ownership. Though multisensory, the experience of body
ownership does not depend on voluntary movement. Even when
passively moved, our arm movement belongs to our body and
is felt as such. Body ownership accompanies all actions, passive,
automatic as well as voluntary ones. By contrast, the sense
of being at the origin of the action is restricted to voluntary
actions.
Beyond a first distinction between the sense of agency and
the sense of ownership (Gallagher, 2000; Marcel, 2003), a later
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distinction between a feeling and a judgment of agency and a
feeling and judgment of ownership was then added to stress
the multifactorial aspect of agency, seen as a cluster of subjec-
tive experiences, feelings and attitudes (Synofzik et al., 2008).
Within this framework, the long-lasting debate of whether the
two aspects of our self-awareness have related or independent
mechanisms is revisited. For example, a recent fMRI study found
no shared activations between body ownership and agency: while
activations in midline cortical structures were associated with a
sense of body ownership, activity in the pre-supplementarymotor
area (pre-SMA) was linked to the sense of agency (Tsakiris et al.,
2010). In addition to pre-SMA and SMA (Farrer et al., 2003;
Yomogida et al., 2010; Nahab et al., 2011), insula (Farrer and
Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC) (Fink et al., 1999) and precuneus (Ruby and Decety,
2001; Farrer and Frith, 2002) were also found to be involved in
the sense of agency. But a major emphasis has been posed on the
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as the neural basis of the sense
of agency. Two among the three existing meta-analyzes devoted
to agency (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Spengler et al., 2009) have
designed an a priori region of interest in TPJ. There are several
reasons to attribute a great importance to TPJ, from “the alien
hand” syndrome (Bundick and Spinella, 2000) or limbs misattri-
butions (Daprati et al., 2000) caused by lesions of these regions,
to the involvement in action awareness (Frith et al., 2000) and
perspective taking (Ruby and Decety, 2003; Thirioux et al., 2010).
Recently, however, Moore and coworkers (Moore et al., 2010)
have argued that the TPJ seems more involved in the feeling of
non-agency than in a sense of self-agency. This consideration
leaves the possibility that the sense of self- versus other-agency
could be supported by partially different neural mechanisms.
A third meta-analysis, led by our team, started from a definition
of sense of agency instead of starting from a definition of regions
of interest (Sperduti et al., 2011). Using activation likelihood
estimation (ALE) method, the meta-analysis revealed dissocia-
tion between brain regions involved in self and external agency
ascription. More specifically, TPJ activity appeared to be more
present in external- than in self-agency ascription. This may be
due to the tasks chosen, all derived from the comparator model
(Jeannerod, 2003b). In these tasks, brain effects of a congruent
visual feedback of self-movements are compared to brain effects
of a non-congruent visual feedback. The task is a solitary task
comparing the visual and kinesthetic feedbacks of an individual
in two experimental conditions.
A challenger to this indirect test of other’s agency is the immer-
sion of subjects in a social context of interaction. Interacting freely
via imitation provides a test-case of the multifactorial aspects of
agency in everyday social life. In Jeannerod’ s words, “an observer
monitoring an action performed by someone else is never far
from also being the agent of that action” (Jeannerod, 2003a).
Further, an observer matching the action performed by someone
else feels this action as its own, and gets a sense of being also the
agent of that action. Body ownership and sense of self- and other-
agency are shared. However, a cognitive component of agency
will differ in the two agents: action primacy will be ascribed to
self by the first author of the action and to other by the imitator.
Such an asymmetry may generate in the first author a rewarding
sense of exerting a power on an audience. For instance, young
infants show a marked visual preference for an imitative experi-
menter compared to a non-imitative one, even when both behave
contingently (Meltzoff, 1990). In adults, being imitated gener-
ates an increase in positive behavior toward the imitator from
the part of the model (Ashton-James et al., 2007). Similarly, chil-
dren with autism address positive social signals like smiles, eye
contact and touch to their imitator (Nadel et al., 2000; Nadel,
2006). There is thus also a benefit to be an imitator. Switching
role from model to imitator like preverbal children do in the
course of an imitative sequence (Nadel and Baudonnière, 1982;
Nadel and Butterworth, 1999) could be understood as a way to
exchange reward while framing imitation as an interactive pattern
of reciprocal initiations and responses. Such interactive pattern is
still observable in adults and generates the involvement of brain
areas concerned with social interaction and cognition (Guionnet
et al., 2011). Many other cases in the domain of social interac-
tion, such as joint attention/activity and social coordination are
well described by a shared sense of agency of action to which may
be added an opposite ascription of primacy of action. Therefore,
there is a need to take seriously the role of social interaction in
individual agency (Decety and Lamm, 2007; David et al., 2008;
de Jaegher and Froese, 2009) and to study the underlying brain
dynamics in a social context.
The hyperscanning methodology constitutes a relevant tool
to explore real-time social phenomena (Montague et al., 2002;
Hasson et al., 2004; Babiloni et al., 2006). Hyperscanning meth-
ods have been recently used to explore interpersonal coordina-
tion (Tognoli et al., 2007; Lindenberger et al., 2009), inter-brain
connectivity-related to decision-making (Astolfi et al., 2010), or
inter-brain synchronization during imitative interaction (Dumas
et al., 2010), but so far, to our own knowledge, they have not been
devoted to study self- versus other-agency. Combining hyperscan-
ning methodology with instantaneous EEG recording seems well
adapted, given its high temporal resolution, to measure brain
dynamics underlying emergent processes such as ascription of
action primacy and shared sense of agency. In view of previ-
ous studies revealing that brain regions, and even single neurons,
do not generally display pure oscillations but oscillate at mul-
tiple frequencies, and that several rhythms can coexist in the
same area or interact among different structures (Llinas, 1988;
Buzsaki and Draguhn, 2004; Steriade, 2006; Kopell et al., 2010),
a holistic intra-brain analysis approach along the spectral dimen-
sion was privileged to study largely unexplored aspects of agency.
Our imitation design also appears to be relevant for such an
exploration. Indeed, it allows compare brain activities associ-
ated with two roles (model and imitator) in two conditions: a
spontaneous imitation (SI) condition where the roles of model
and imitator are freely negotiated by the partners themselves,
and an induced imitation (II) condition where the repartition of
roles is instructed (please imitate the gestures you see/please move
your hands in order to be imitated). To approach the potentially
different processes in play for the two roles in the two condi-
tions, contrasts were designed, based on hypotheses drawn from
the EEG literature or from our own previous results. Contrasts
aimed first at controlling for action and for action observation,
second at controlling for self- and other-ascription of agency in
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II, and third at testing whether similar components of self- and
other-ascription of agency are to be found in the SI condition.
In view of the EEG/MEG literature, we anticipated decrease of
oscillations in the mu (8–13Hz) and beta (13–30Hz) frequency
ranges over the sensorimotor cortex under conditions of obser-
vation and execution of movements (Cochin et al., 1999; Pineda,
2005; Lepage and Theoret, 2006; Oberman et al., 2007; Calmels
et al., 2008; Muthukumaraswamy and Singh, 2008). Concerning
the two roles of model and imitator, we foresighted that the social
context should modulate neural dynamics given that in our pre-
vious study (Dumas et al., 2010) inter-brain synchronizations
were found in different frequency bands for induced compared
to SI conditions. We expected differential EEG oscillations for
the two roles during the induced condition of imitation where
the roles are externally assigned. By contrast, we expected similar
oscillatory activity within several frequency bands in the SI con-
dition where partners negotiate roles with a sense of being each
an actor of the negotiation. More specifically, we took account of
previous studies documenting the involvement, in agency or own-
ership ascription, of gamma-band (30–70Hz) oscillations over
the centro-parietal and temporal regions (Pavlova et al., 2006;
Kanayama et al., 2009; Pavlova et al., 2010). We thus investigated
whether rapid oscillations in these regions may discriminate the
two partners as a function of action primacy ascribed to self, to
other, or to both.
Of course we do not claim that all mechanisms and interac-
tions involved in the complex phenomena studied are assessed
in the contrasts computed, but at least the contrasts chosen will
allow start exploring the terra incognita of agency within a social
context.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-two healthy adults of mean age 24.5 years (SD = 2.8)
forming 11 unacquainted pairs (five female-female and six male-
male pairs) participated in the study. All of them were right-
handed. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
none of them reported a history of psychiatric or neurologi-
cal diseases. The participants had given their written informed
consent according to the declaration of Helsinki and the chart
of the local ethics committee. The subjects were paid for their
participation.
APPARATUS AND SETTING
The experiment was conducted in two separate laboratory rooms.
Figure 1 describes the design and equipment that were similar
to the double-video system designed by Nadel and colleagues
for their developmental studies of sensitivity to social contin-
gency in infants (Nadel et al., 1999; Soussignan et al., 2006),
except that a dual EEG recording system was added to the setup.
Two synchronized DV video cameras filmed the handmovements
of each partner (see Video S1). Each participant could see the
partner’s hands through 21 inches. TV monitors, the forearms
lying on a small table to prevent arm and neck movements. The
monitoring of the experiment was performed in a third room
where two computers managed both the dual EEG and video
recordings.
FIGURE 1 | Apparatus and experimental setting of the double-video
system and dual-EEG recording.
PROCEDURE
Table 1 describes the experimental schedule. The experiment was
divided into two blocks, each composed of four runs. Each run
began with a 15 s no view no motion (NVNM) baseline where
participants were asked to fix a blank screen without moving.
Depending on the runs, NVNM was directly followed by an
observation condition (run 1) or by another 15 s baseline no
view motion (NVM) for the three experimental runs of imita-
tion. During the NVM baseline, subjects were asked to move their
hands continuously while looking at the blank screen.
The observation condition consisted in the observation of a
library of intransitive hand movements (LIHM) composed of 20
meaningless hand/finger movements continuously executed by an
actor. In the SI condition, the participants were proposed to move
their hands continuously and to imitate their partner whenever
they would like it. This led to spontaneously coordinate two roles:
imitate and be imitated. In the II condition, subject 1 (imita-
tor) was asked to imitate continuously the hand movements of
subject 2 (model) who was told to move hands freely, and vice-
versa for the other run, with a counterbalanced order in block 2
(see Table 1).
CONTRASTS
Contrasting NVM to NVNM allows controlling for motor activ-
ity to which is added a sense of self-agency. Contrasting LIHM to
NVNM leads to control for action observation to which is added
a sense of other-agency. In a second round, contrasting the role
of induced imitator [Im (II)] to NVM will consist in compar-
ing an instructed task of “observe and match” the partner’s action
with a motor task attributed to self: this would lead to document
other-agency and action primacy attributed to other while motor
activity attributed to self is controlled. Of course the movement is
not the same in the two conditions and it can be argued that the
difference attributed to agency can be explained by mere motor
difference. Nevertheless, our imitation condition generates differ-
ent results compared to motor only condition. Moreover, it has
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Table 1 | Experimental schedule.
Condition (Block 1) NVNM + library of NVNM + NVM + NVNM + NVM + NVNM + NVM +
intransitive spontaneous induced imitation (II), induced imitation (II),
movements (LIHM) imitation (SI) subject 1: imitator, subject 2: imitator,
subject 2: model subject 1: model
PAUSE: 10MIN
Condition (Block 2) NVNM + library of NVNM + NVM + NVNM + NVM + NVNM + NVM +
intransitive spontaneous induced Imitation (II), induced imitation (II),
movements (LIHM) imitation (SI) subject 2: imitator, subject 1: imitator,
subject 1: model subject 2: model
Duration 15 s + 1min 30s 15 s + 15s +1min 30 s 15 s + 15s + 1min 30 s 15s + 15 s + 1min 30 s
been shown that the pattern of finger movement sequences has
low influence on the related inter-regional brain activity (Calmels
et al., 2008) and was restricted to spectral power decreases in the
alpha band over centro-parietal regions (Manganotti et al., 1998).
Contrasting the role of induced model [Mod (II)] to NVM
consists in comparing an instructed task of “initiate an action to
be imitated by the other” with a motor task attributed to self. This
would lead to document action primacy attributed to self, while
the other components are controlled.
In a third round, contrasting, respectively, the role of sponta-
neous imitator [Im (SI)] to NVM and the role of spontaneous
model [Mod (SI)] to NVM will test whether ascription of action
primacy to other or to self differ when roles are freely negotiated
compared to instructed roles. Finally, the role of model and of
imitator will be contrasted according to the imitation condition.
DUAL EEG DATA-ACQUISITION
The neural activities of the two participants were simultaneously
recorded with a dual-EEG recording system. It was composed of
two Acticap helmets with 32 active electrodes arranged accord-
ing to the international 10/20 system. We modified the helmets
in order to cover at best the occipito-parietal regions. Four
electrodes T7, T8, CP9, and CP10 were rejected due to arti-
facts. Ground electrode was placed on the right shoulder of
the subjects and the reference was fixed on the nasion. The
impedances were maintained below 10 k. Data acquisition was
performed using a 64-channels Brainamp MR amplifier from the
Brain Products Company (Germany). Signals were analog filtered
between 0.16Hz and 250Hz, amplified and digitalized at 500Hz
with a 16-bit vertical resolution in the range of±3.2mV.
RECORDED BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
The coding of the recordings used the ELAN software
(Grynszpan, 2006; Sloetjes and Wittenburg, 2008) allowing a
simultaneous presentation of the frames from the two part-
ners, together with a recording of time (latency, duration) and
occurrence of behavioral events. Digitalized videotapes of each
participant were synchronized and a frame-by-frame analysis was
conducted in order to extract the periods of imitation as well as
the roles defining who was imitating (Imitator) and who was imi-
tated (Model). Imitation was assessed when the hand movements
of the two partners showed a similar morphology (describing a
circle, waving, swinging. . .) and a similar direction (up, down,
right, left. . .). For each imitative episode, the individual who
started a hand movement followed by the partner was labeled the
“model,” and the follower was labeled the “imitator.” A substantial
inter-coder agreement was assessed through kappa coefficients
(>0.80). Imitation epochs were on average 6 s long (SD = 4 s)
and represented 64.69% of the interaction time (for details, see
Dumas et al., 2010).
EEG ARTIFACTS
The correction of eye blink artifacts in the EEG data was per-
formed using a classical principal component analysis (PCA)
filtering algorithm (Wallstrom et al., 2004a,b). We used 800ms
windows with 400ms of overlap. For each window, a PCA was
performed on the raw signal and all the PCA-components were
compared to an estimation of the electro-oculogram (EOG)
computed from the difference between the mean of the raw chan-
nels FP1 and FP2 and the nasion reference. If the correlation
between the reconstructed EOG signal and each PCA-component
exceeded an adaptive threshold, the eigenvalue-related to the
component was fixed to zero. Then the converted EEG signal can
be reconstructed by using the inverse solution of the PCA. The
adaptive threshold was proportional to the standard deviation
of the considered ith component divided by those of the current
window signal:
Thresholdi= 0.7× σ(ci)
σ
(∑
i
ci
) (1)
where σ(ci) stands for the standard deviation of the ith component
of the PCA and σ(
∑
i ci) is the standard deviation of the signal.
EEG signals were then controlled visually another time in order to
eliminate muscular artifacts. These EEG segments were excluded
from the analysis and, in order to avoid border artifacts induced
by their suppression, we smoothed the joints by a convolution
with a half-Hanning window of 400ms.
EEG ANALYSIS
Instead of using selected large frequency bands, we have covered
the whole spectrum (0–48Hz) with 1Hz frequency bins, which
accounts at best for the variability in frequency distributions
across subjects.
Following corrections, EEG data were re-referenced to a com-
mon average reference (CAR). Then a fast fourier transform
(FFT) was applied on 800ms windows, smoothed by Hanning
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weighting function and half-overlapping across either the whole
trials in the case of contrasts between conditions or the segments
corresponding to the behavioral analysis as Imitator or Model in
the SI condition.
STATISTICAL ANALYZES
Significance of the differences in all contrasts was established
using a non-parametric cluster randomization test across spa-
tial and spectral domains (Nichols and Holmes, 2002; Maris
and Oostenveld, 2007; Maris et al., 2007). This test effectively
controls the false discovery rate in situations involving multi-
ple comparisons by clustering neighboring quantities that exhibit
the same effect. For the amplitude analysis, the neighborhood
was univariate across space (adjacent electrode over the scalp)
and frequencies (side-by-side frequency bins). The permutation
method provides values whose t statistics exceed a given critical
value when comparing two conditions value by value. In order
to correct for multiple comparisons, neighbor values exceeding
the critical value were considered as a member of the same clus-
ter. The cluster-statistic (CS) was taken as the sum of t values
in a given cluster. Evaluating the CS distribution through 1000
permutations controlled the false discovery rate (Pantazis et al.,
2005). Each permutation represented a randomization of the data
between the two conditions and across multiple subjects. For
each permutation the CSs were computed by taking the cluster
with the maximum sum of t statistics. The threshold controlling
the family wise error rate (FWER) was determined according to
the proportion of the randomization null distribution exceed-
ing the observed maximum CS (Monte Carlo test). Clusters
containing less than three different electrodes or three differ-
ent frequency bins were excluded. We used a threshold critical
value of |2σ|.
RESULTS
Table A1 in the appendix data summarizes all contrasts
computed.
CONTROL CONDITIONS
Execution of movement [NVM–NVNM]
Moving hands increased the delta band amplitude in the frontal
(2–4Hz; Fz, FC1, C3; CS = 28.3, p < 0.05) region, whereas
decrease in the alpha-mu and beta bands was, respectively,
observed in the parieto-central (10–12Hz; CP2, CP6, P3, PZ, P4,
P8, PO1; CS = −68.4, p < 0.05) and fronto-central (19–25Hz;
Fz, F4, FC2, Cz, C4; CS= −66.2, p < 0.05) regions (see Figures 2
and 4A).
FIGURE 2 | Non-parametric clustering analysis applied to the NVM
versus NVNM contrast. Rows and columns represent, respectively,
electrodes and frequency bins. Electrodes are grouped by anatomical region.
The color stands for the t-values calculated between the two conditions with
the subject average fast Fourier transform (FFT) components. Topographies
at the bottom represent the mean t-values across the frequency range of the
considered clusters. Statistical clusters are outlined in thick black lines for
both representations. NVM, no view motion; NVNM, no view no motion.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 128 | 5
Dumas et al. Neural dynamics of agency ascription
Passive observation of movement [LIHM–NVNM]
Passive observation of hand movements (LIHM) induced an
increase in delta and theta amplitudes in the fronto-central
(1–5Hz; FC1, FC2, C4, CP6; CS = 184.4, p < 0.001) and pari-
etal (6–8Hz; CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4, PO1; CS = 223.7, p < 0.001)
regions (see Figure 3A), respectively, and a decrease of high
alpha-mu rhythm in the centro-parietal regions (11–13Hz; CP1,
CP2, P3, PO1; CS= −123.0, p < 0.001).
INDUCED IMITATION CONDITION
Induced imitator [Im (II)–NVM]
When the role of induced imitator was contrasted with solitary
execution of movement, amplitude increased in the delta band
over the right fronto-central regions (2–4Hz; FC1, FC2, C4, CP2;
CS = 136.8, p < 0.001; see Figure 3B). There was also a decrease
of alpha-mu activity in the parietal region (12–14Hz; CP1, CP2,
P3; CS= −106.6, p < 0.001).
Induced model [Mod (II)–NVM]
When the role of induced model was contrasted with solitary exe-
cution of movement, an increase of amplitude was observed in
the theta band over centro-parietal regions (4–8Hz; CP1, P3, Pz,
PO1; CS= 131.4, p < 0.001; see Figure 5D) whereas a decrease in
alpha-mu rhythm was found over parietal region (11–14Hz; CP1,
CP2, P3, Pz, P4, P8, PO1; CS = −244.6, p < 0.001). There was
also a decrease of activity in the beta band over the fronto-central
regions (23–26Hz; FC1, Cz, CP2; CS = −135.6, p < 0.001; see
Figure 4B).
SPONTANEOUS IMITATION CONDITION
Spontaneous imitator [Im (SI)–NVM]
When a participant was freely imitating compared with soli-
tary execution of movement, gamma amplitude increased in the
centro-parietal region (38–47Hz; CP6, P4, P8, PO1, Oz, PO2;
CS = 130.2, p < 0.001; see Figure 5A). There was also a decrease
in the alpha-mu band over the parietal region (10–14Hz; Pz, P4,
P8, Oz, PO2; CS= −63.4, p < 0.05).
Spontaneous model [Mod (SI)–NVM]
When a participant was freely initiating an imitation com-
pared with solitary execution of movement, gamma amplitude
FIGURE 3 | Self-agency and beta frequency band effects. NVM versus
NVNM (A) and Model in II versus NVM (B) show a similar decrease of the
beta activity (19–26Hz) across the right fronto-central regions. The color
stands for the mean t-values across the frequency range of the considered
clusters. Statistical clusters are outlined in thick black lines for both
representations. II, induced imitation. For other abbreviations, see Figure 2.
increased over centro-parietal regions (42–47Hz; C4, CP6, P4,
P8, PO1, PO2; CS = 117.0, p < 0.001; see Figure 5B) whereas
a decrease was observed in the alpha-mu band over the pari-
etal region (10–14Hz; Pz, P4, P8, PO1, Oz, PO2; CS = −73.4,
p < 0.05).
INFLUENCE OF THE SOCIAL CONTEXT
The two roles of model and imitator were contrasted in the two
conditions to evaluate the influence of the social context.
Influence of the social context regarding the role of imitator
[Im (SI)–Im (II)]
A decrease in the theta/alpha band amplitude was found in
occipito-parietal regions (4–9Hz; CP6, P4, P8, PO9, Oz, PO2;
CS = −68.0 p < 0.05).
Influence of the social context regarding the role of model
[Mod (SI)–Mod (II)]
No difference was found between the two conditions.
DISCUSSION
Using reciprocal imitation as a test-case for the multifactorial
account of agency, we aimed at delineating the brain dynamics-
related to different components of agency as they emerge from
a live interaction between two persons. In this situation, one has
to differentiate who generated first the action imitated, who is in
control of the imitation, and who feel the action as one’s own
action. A simultaneous EEG record of dyads engaged in differ-
ent imitative conditions allowed us to use contrasts providing a
few answers to these questions. A few answers only can be pro-
vided, since, as already stressed in the introduction, the whole
mechanisms and interactions included into the complex phe-
nomenon studied cannot be assessed via the computed contrasts.
The contrasts were chosen so as to control for action and action
observation, then for self- and other-ascription of agency in the
externally driven condition of imitation. Based on the results of
the controls, we investigated if similar components of self- and
other- ascription of agency were present in the SI condition. Were
our controls strong enough? It may be argued that the move-
ment is not the same in the two conditions: this is only partly
true (i.e., the number of intransitive gestures that do not imply to
FIGURE 4 | Other agency and delta frequency band effects. LIHM
versus NVNM (A) and Imitator in II versus NVM (B) show a similar increase
of delta activity (>0–5 Hz) mostly over the right central region. The color
stands for the mean t-values across the frequency range of the considered
clusters. Statistical clusters are outlined in thick black lines for both
representations. For abbreviations, see previous figures. LIHM, library of
intransitive hand movements.
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link hands is limited) and in any case the pattern of finger move-
ment sequences has low influence on the related-inter-regional
brain activity (Calmels et al., 2008). It may also be questioned
whether the difference attributed to agency ascription could not
be explained by mere visual or motor difference within contrasts.
This question can be answered using the multifactorial two-step
account of agency proposed by Synofzik et al. (2008). Indeed,
our design offers the example of a social situation where there
are strong similarities between what is seen and what is acted,
although what is seen is what the other does and what we feel
as ours is the action we are doing but not seeing. The challenge is,
beyond shared feeling of ownership and agency, to process con-
ceptually so as to correctly ascribe the primacy of agency to self
or to other. Far from resulting uniquely from action observation
or action execution, such challenge is the genuine byproduct of a
cross-coupling of observation and action between two individu-
als: accordingly our imitation condition generates different results
compared to motor only condition.
Let us summarize what was common to all conditions ana-
lyzed. As predicted and widely documented (Cochin et al., 1999;
Pineda, 2005; Lepage and Theoret, 2006; Oberman et al., 2007;
Calmels et al., 2008; Muthukumaraswamy and Singh, 2008), we
found a decrease of oscillations in the alpha-mu over the senso-
rimotor cortex under conditions of observation and execution of
movements as well as in all observation/execution related con-
trasts in a common frequency range of 10–14Hz. These results
are in line with the proposal that mu rhythm desynchroniza-
tion acts as an index of perception-action coupling (Pineda, 2005;
Oberman et al., 2008).
Beyond these similarities, strong differences appeared. Action
production and observation differed for other frequencies: beta
activity specifically decreased over the fronto-central regions dur-
ing action production contrasted with rest (NVM vs. NVNM),
while delta/theta-frequency band increased during action obser
vation contrasted with rest (LIHM vs. NVNM) over the cen-
tral region. Differences concerning these frequency bands also
appeared for the roles of imitator and model in the condition
of II.
SELF- AND OTHER- ASCRIPTION OF ACTION PRIMACY
Contrasting brain activity when the subject was the model ver-
sus when moving hands without vision (NVM baseline) revealed
modulation in alpha-mu and beta frequency bands like for action
production (NVM vs. NVNM) but not in delta/theta-frequency
unlike in action observation (LIHM vs. NVNM). In this line,
there is increasing evidence that beta oscillations underpin the
integration of sensorimotor processes (Baker, 2007) through
large-scale communication (Roelfsema et al., 1997; Brovelli et al.,
2004; Tsujimoto et al., 2009). Reversely, the contrast between
the brain activity of the induced imitator versus NVM revealed
modulations in alpha-mu and delta/theta-frequency bands over
fronto-central and parietal regions like for action observation
but not in beta, unlike in action production. This focal increase
in delta activity might be associated with an attentional con-
trol over the primary motor cortex. Although delta frequency
band is poorly documented concerning motor-related tasks,
recent studies suggest indeed that delta activity may reflect a
potential top-down control in perceptive tasks (Lakatos et al.,
2008; Anastassiou et al., 2011). We reasoned that the decrease
in beta activity should, therefore, be related to a primacy of
action in self, and the increase in delta/theta activity to a pri-
macy of observation of the model in other, therefore, underlining
other-ascription of action primacy.
SHARED AGENCY DURING SPONTANEOUS IMITATION CONDITION
We compared each role in the SI condition with the NVM base-
line. Unlike in II, oscillatory rhythms were similar for model and
imitator (see Figure 5). For both roles, contrasts showed a gamma
increase over parietal regions. Gamma frequency has been asso-
ciated with various cognitive functions (Jensen et al., 2007) and
was reported to reflect local processing at the cortical level (Fries,
2009). Importantly, an increase in gamma activity has been found
over parietal region during the perception and ascription of bio-
logical movement (Pavlova et al., 2006), and TPJ region has been
shown to play critical functions in attention, agency and social
interaction (Decety and Lamm, 2007). The gamma increase was
not found in other contrasts than those involving the two spon-
taneous roles of imitation. This symmetric increase is proposed
here as related to the phenomenon of shared agency between
the two interacting partners. Particularly relevant with this pro-
posal is the study by Kanayama et al. (2009) showing a gamma
increase related to intermodal interaction when the rubber hand
is attributed to self.
Finally, comparing each role according to the condition led
us to observe a theta decrease for the imitator in SI compared
to II. Theta-frequency activity has been reported to be involved in
FIGURE 5 | Co-ownership and low/high frequency bands effects.
Compared to baseline (NVM), Imitator and Model show a similar increase in
gamma activity (38–47Hz) in parietal regions during SI while this effect was
not present in II (A and B). However, there is an increase for both
delta/theta activity (2–8Hz) in II but topographies are different. While this
change occurs in the right central region for the Imitator (C), it is more
localized over the precuneus region for the Model (D). The color stands for
the mean t-values across the frequency range of the considered clusters.
Statistical clusters are outlined in thick black lines for both representations.
For abbreviations, see previous figures. SI, spontaneous imitation.
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working memory (Scheeringa et al., 2009; Brookes et al., 2011)
and thus its recruitment can point out a cognitive load during
instructed imitation.
BEYOND SYMMETRY
The stance highlighting the intra-brain symmetry between obser-
vation and action has gained a renewed influence after the dis-
covery of the MNS (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Caetano
et al., 2007) and rapidly extended to hypotheses concerning inter-
brain symmetry. In favor of this extension are the biological
similarities and constraints among conspecifics (Hasson et al.,
2004). More precisely, the anatomic-functional similarity among
human brains enhances dynamical similarities and thus facili-
tates interindividual couplings (Dumas et al., 2012). However,
the neuromimetic model cannot fully account for social interac-
tion (Petit, 2003). Beyond symmetry indeed, another component
of any social interaction is in play: namely, alternation in com-
plementary social roles, yielding asymmetry of action processing
in the interacting partners. This component is especially impor-
tant to assess a multiaccount of agency. While the symmetry of
action generates shared feeling of agency, the asymmetry of roles
leads to alternate the ascription of who is the agent of what. At
some extent, we can consider the condition of II as an ampli-
fier of the asymmetry of roles inasmuch as the normal flow of
interaction is disrupted by the instruction to maintain the role.
In this condition therefore, there is a difference between model
and imitator that can be understood as a clear-cut difference
in ascription of action primacy. Reversely, the condition of SI
certainly acts as an amplifier of symmetry since partners share
perception and action and anticipate next exchange of role, thus
generating a binding between people (Hari and Kujala, 2009).
Everyday social interaction is certainly at the middle of the road.
In the same way as segregation and integration form a comple-
mentary pair in brain activity, a successful communication needs
altogether a clear repartition of the roles and a co-regulation of
the exchange (Fogel, 1993). This co-regulation and the sharing of
purpose between the interactants ensure the autonomy of the two
partners as well as their ability to make the distinction between
what originates from self and what originates from the other.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Convergent evidence in neuroscience leads to underline that cor-
tical mechanisms are not fully described by a simple functional
specificity of spatial regions or electrophysiological rhythms
(Roopun et al., 2008; Kopell et al., 2010). However, temptation
remains high, in the realm of social neuroscience, to search for
a specific signature of social interaction. The alpha-mu rhythm
illustrates well this complex issue. Following the demonstration of
its dissociative functions in the processing of sensorimotor infor-
mation for different frequency ranges and somatotopic regions
(Pfurtscheller et al., 2000), it has been recently suggested that
rhythms in this frequency range could have more specific social
meaning in other regions than in sensorimotor cortices (Naeem
et al., 2011) albeit mu rhythm modulation is currently the main
EEG signature proposed for MNS (Pineda, 2005; Oberman et al.,
2008). At least if the focus remains a search for specific signature
of social cognition, detailed spectral analyzes should be used fol-
lowing Tognoli and colleagues (Tognoli et al., 2007) when they
identified phi markers. Connectivity approaches also represent
a promising methodological jump for the future. If we take as
an example the fronto-parietal network, it has been proposed by
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010) to be at
the core of social cognition. Neural oscillations within this net-
work have been closely associated with cognitive processes during
the course of social interactions such as sensorimotor integra-
tion (Basar et al., 2001; Palva and Palva, 2007), perception-action
coupling (Hari et al., 1998; Pineda, 2005; Calmels et al., 2008)
or control of spatial attention (Capotosto et al., 2009). However,
strong functional links have also been found to play a key role in
perceptual awareness without any social context (Gaillard et al.,
2009). An integrative vista is thus specifically needed in the case
of social cognition where multiple cognitive functions are jointly
at play. The present study adopted such a perspective and consid-
ered the potential diversity of brain dynamics underlying agency.
Although the present results only give a partial account of this
diversity, they nevertheless point on dissociation at the neural
level between self-, other-, and shared-ascription of action pri-
macy. Moreover, the difference observed between spontaneous
and II illustrates the crucial importance of the context in the
investigation of brain correlates of social interaction. Systemic
and dynamical approaches in social neuroscience may help dis-
entangling multiple types of neural correlates and bring them
together into a coherent whole.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Summary of amplitude for delta, theta, alpha-mu, beta, and gamma frequency bands.
Delta Theta Alpha-Mu Beta Gamma
Frontal NVM-NVNM (+) NVM-NVNM (−)
LIHM-NVNM (+) Mod(II)-NVM (−)
Im(II)-NVM (+)
Central NVM-NVNM (+) LIHM-NVNM (+) NVM-NVNM (−) NVM-NVNM (−) Im(SI)-NVM (+)
LIHM-NVNM (+) Mod(II)-NVM (+) LIHM-NVNM (−) Mod(II)-NVM (−) Mod(SI)-NVM (+)
Im(II)-NVM (+) Im(SI)-Im(II) (−) Im(II)-NVM (−)
Mod(II)-NVM (−)
Parietal LIHM-NVNM (+) LIHM-NVNM (+) NVM-NVNM (−)
Mod(II)-NVM (+) LIHM-NVNM (−)
Im(SI)-Im(II) (−) Im(II)-NVM (−) Im(SI)-NVM (+)
Im(SI)-NVM (−) Mod(SI)-NVM (+)
Mod(II)-NVM (−)
Mod(SI)-NVM (−)
Im(SI)-Im(II) (−)
Occipital Im(SI)-Im(II) (−) Im(SI)-Im(II) (−) Im(SI)-NVM (+)
Im(SI)-NVM (−) Mod(SI)-NVM (+)
Mod(SI)-NVM (−)
(+) indicates an increase and (−) a decrease of EEG amplitudes. NVNM, no view no motion; NVM, no view motion; LIHM, library of intransitive hand movements;
Im, imitator; Mod, model; SI, spontaneous imitation; II, induced imitation.
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